Subjective experience and ontological uncertainty of consciousness

Abstract

This article examines consciousness from a philosophical and legal perspective, treating it as a phenomenonsituated between objectively observable cognitive processes and subjective experience that cannot be directlyverified from the outside. Developments in neuroscience, cognitive psychology, neurotechnology, and artifi-cial intelligence bring this problem into practical legal theory. Law treats human beings as conscious agents,although their inner experience remains inaccessible to external observers. The aim is to develop an integra-tive conceptual model of consciousness that accounts for objectively recorded correlates and the phenomenalopacity of subjective experience, and to examine its implications for guilt, intent, legal capacity, mental pri-vacy, and the possible legal personhood of artificial systems. The study uses a qualitative conceptual-analytical approach combining ontological analysis, epistemological reconstruction, thought experiments, andnormative-legal reflection. Consciousness is under-stood as a multilayered phenomenon grounded in biologi-cal and cognitive processes, yet not reducible to them. Legal categories presupposing conscious agency there-fore operate under epistemic uncertainty. As a normative response, the article proposes the «presumption ofconsciousness» for complex systems. This principle does not entail automatic recognition of AI as a legalsubject, but requires caution before dismissing the possibility of subjective experience in highly advanced ar-tificial agents.