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## **The Ethical Triad of Shakarim Kudaiberdyuly: A Philosophical Reconstruction of the Concept of Ujdan**

This article examines the concept of ujdan in the worldview of Shakarim Kudaiberdyuly through the ethical triad Ynsap–Adilet–Meirim. The study argues that ujdan should not be understood merely in the narrow lexical sense of “conscience,” but rather as an integrated ethical principle that unites moral self-restraint, justice, and compassion. On this basis, the article aims to clarify the philosophical meaning of each component of the triad and to demonstrate that their unity forms a normative model of moral personality in Shakarim’s ethical thought. The methodological basis of the study is grounded in the original philosophical, ethical, and poetic texts of Shakarim Kudaiberdyuly, interpreted through a historical-philosophical and hermeneutic approach. The analysis employs conceptual reconstruction, close reading, and comparative interpretation in order to identify the internal structure of ujdan and its relation to adjacent categories such as soul, responsibility, moral self-restraint, and the inner regulation of action. The study shows that ynsap functions as moral measure and self-restraint, adilet as the principle of justice and moral responsibility, and meirim as the ethical basis of compassion and humane relations. Taken together, these concepts constitute ujdan as the inner foundation of both individual moral life and social harmony. The article further demonstrates that Shakarim’s doctrine of conscience is inseparable from his broader ethical anthropology, according to which the condition of society depends on the moral condition of the human person. The findings also indicate that Shakarim’s concept of ujdan should be regarded as one of the key categories of Kazakh ethical thought. In this sense, his doctrine of conscience possesses not only historical and cultural significance, but also contemporary philosophical relevance for discussions of moral education, ethical anthropology, and the humane foundations of social life.

**Keywords:** Shakarim Kudaiberdyuly, ujdan, conscience, Ynsap, Adilet, Meirim, Kazakh ethics, moral philosophy, ethical anthropology.

### *Introduction*

In every sphere of public life, the issue of social and moral education occupies a central place. The foundations of educational thought developed over centuries are rooted not only in institutional traditions, but also in the moral wisdom of the people and in the intellectual legacy of thinkers who articulated and preserved that wisdom in philosophical, literary, and spiritual forms. In the Kazakh intellectual tradition, this legacy remains especially significant, since questions of human dignity, conscience, justice, compassion, and moral self-cultivation have long been inseparable from broader reflections on society, culture, and the meaning of human existence. Within this tradition, the works of Shakarim Kudaiberdyuly occupy a distinctive place. His writings represent not merely a literary heritage, but a coherent moral-philosophical vision concerned with the ethical formation of the person, the purification of inner life, and the relationship between the individual, society, and the transcendent moral order.

In recent decades, Shakarim Kudaiberdyuly’s spiritual and intellectual legacy has increasingly become a distinct object of scholarly inquiry in Kazakhstan and is gradually taking shape as an established field of research. Scholars have sought to clarify the foundations of his views on morality, education, religion, and social life. For example, the studies of G. Yessim, K. Zharykbayev and A. Qudiyarova examine various dimensions of Shakarim’s educational and ethical worldview, showing that his thought cannot be reduced either to literary expression alone or to narrowly didactic concerns. Rather, his reflections belong to a broader philosophical discourse in which the formation of moral consciousness is inseparable from the cultivation of human character and the ethical orientation of society.

Scholar N. Sultanova systematizes the educational dimensions of Shakarim’s oeuvre as follows:

- 1) intellectual education related to knowledge and learning;
- 2) moral education;
- 3) aesthetic education;

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4) labor and environmental education;

5) family education, illustrating each category with examples from his poetry [1; 13].

However, such a classification should not be understood as a fragmented or isolated reading of his legacy. Rather, all of these thematic directions are encompassed within the framework of *Ar ilimi* and therefore require an integral and holistic interpretation. Such an integral reading is justified by the fact that the ultimate aim of education in Shakarim's thought is unified: to cultivate and refine human character, elevating it to an ethically and spiritually noble level. Through this process, a person's relationship to society, the surrounding world, and nature is transformed, while the horizon of understanding is enriched through moral and educational formation. Thus, Shakarim's educational philosophy is inseparable from his ethical anthropology and from his broader effort to articulate a normative model of human moral development.

Over time, the relevance of Shakarim Kudaiberdyuly's *Ar ilimi* has become increasingly evident, and it has gradually come to be recognized as a doctrine capable of regulating the relationship between the individual and society and of offering an ethical response to moral decline. Its enduring significance lies in the fact that it contains an intellectual and moral force capable of addressing the challenges of different historical periods and of orienting the individual toward moral self-cultivation. This may be explained, on the one hand, by the fact that Shakarim consciously addressed his reflections to future generations, placed particular hope in the moral maturity of youth, and sought to identify ways of freeing human beings from destructive tendencies. On the other hand, it is also connected with the recovery of his legacy after it survived Soviet ideological distortion and gradually re-entered intellectual and academic life in the period of independence. Only in more recent decades have scholars gained broader access to such works as *Imany*, devoted to faith, morality, moral self-cultivation (*akhlaq*), and education; *Ush Anyq*, his philosophical and metaphysical treatise; *Musylmandyq Sharty*; and his prose reflections. Across these writings, social, ethical, and educational ideas are extensively articulated, making them an essential source for the study of Kazakh moral philosophy.

At the same time, despite the growing body of scholarship on Shakarim's worldview, the concept of *ujdan* has not yet received sufficient systematic philosophical analysis as a unified ethical structure grounded in the triad *Ynsap–Adilet–Meirim*. Previous studies have often discussed Shakarim's moral and educational views in broad terms, whereas the internal conceptual organization of conscience in his thought remains insufficiently clarified. In particular, *ujdan* is frequently translated simply as "conscience," yet such a lexical equivalence does not fully capture its ethical depth, anthropological function, and normative role in Shakarim's philosophy. In his thought, *ujdan* is not merely an inner feeling of moral approval or remorse; rather, it operates as an integrated ethical principle that links self-restraint, justice, compassion, and responsibility into a single model of moral agency.

This problem is especially important because the category of *ujdan* occupies a central place in Shakarim's understanding of the human being. It mediates between the inner world of the person and the ethical order of social life, and it also connects the moral condition of the individual with broader questions of spiritual maturity, truthfulness, and accountability. For this reason, the study of *ujdan* should not be confined to lexical or purely religious interpretation, but should be approached as a philosophical category within the structure of Shakarim's ethical anthropology. Such an approach makes it possible to reconsider Shakarim's thought not only within the history of Kazakh enlightenment or moral pedagogy, but also within wider discussions of conscience, virtue, moral self-regulation, and the formation of ethical subjectivity.

Therefore, the present article examines the philosophical meaning of *ujdan* in Shakarim's worldview through the ethical triad *Ynsap–Adilet–Meirim* and argues that this triad forms a normative model of moral personality. Particular attention is given to those texts in which *ujdan* is articulated not merely as conscience in a lexical sense, but as an inner ethical principle linking moral measure, justice, and compassion. The article also aims to show that Shakarim's interpretation of *ujdan* possesses not only historical and cultural significance within Kazakh thought, but also contemporary philosophical relevance, especially in discussions concerning moral education, ethical anthropology, and the search for integrative models of human ethical self-understanding.

### *Materials and Methods*

The methodological basis of this study is grounded primarily in the original works of Shakarim Kudaiberdyuly, including his philosophical, ethical, and poetic texts in which the semantic and conceptual field of *ujdan* is articulated. In accordance with a source-hierarchy principle, Shakarim's own writings con-

stitute the core research material, while secondary scholarship—especially Kazakh and Turkish studies on Shakarim, as well as comparative works on *vicdan* and conscience—is used for contextualization, conceptual clarification, and philosophical comparison.

The study adopts a historical-philosophical and hermeneutic approach. Rather than remaining at the level of abstract moral generalizations, the analysis moves to the micro-level of textual ethical constructions by examining recurring conceptual clusters in which *ujdan* is connected with *ynsap*, *adilet*, and *meirim*, as well as with adjacent categories such as soul, reason, responsibility, and moral self-restraint. This approach makes it possible to trace how Shakarim's ethical language functions not merely as a set of virtues, but as an integrated normative model of moral agency.

The research employs both general analytical and specialized philosophical methods. The general methods include analysis and synthesis, induction and deduction, comparison, typologization, and the systematization of textual material. The specialized methods include hermeneutic close reading, conceptual reconstruction, historical-philosophical contextualization, and comparative ethical interpretation. On this basis, the study reconstructs a conceptual map of its key categories, including *ujdan*, *ynsap*, *adilet*, *meirim*, moral responsibility, and the inner regulation of action.

This methodological framework makes it possible to connect Shakarim's ethical anthropology and moral philosophy with analytically grounded conclusions regarding the ethical meaning of the *Ynsap–Adilet–Meirim* triad. It also helps maintain a balance between fidelity to Shakarim's original language and broader comparative philosophical interpretation within the discourse of *ujdan*, *vicdan*, and conscience.

In addition, the study incorporates contextual reading of secondary scholarship, comparative terminological analysis of *ujdan*, *vicdan*, and conscience, and source-critical verification of cited materials. All direct quotations are explicitly identified and documented in accordance with the citation format adopted in this article. Where a statement by Shakarim is cited indirectly through a secondary source, this is clearly marked as a secondary citation in order to preserve textual and methodological accuracy.

### *Discussion*

The relevance of Shakarim Kudaiberdyuly's *Ar ilimi* has become especially visible in the modern period, when questions of moral crisis, the weakening of social solidarity, and the loss of inner ethical orientation have once again moved to the center of intellectual discussion. In this context, Shakarim's teaching should be understood not as a narrowly historical phenomenon, but as a comprehensive ethical doctrine directed toward the reconstruction of the human person and the renewal of the moral foundations of society. Its importance lies in the fact that it approaches social disorder not primarily as an institutional or political problem, but as a consequence of the degradation of the inner world of the human being. For Shakarim, the decline of justice in society begins with the decline of conscience in the individual. This is why *Ar ilimi* may be interpreted as a doctrine aimed at restoring the connection between person and community through the ethical transformation of the self. Such a reading is also consistent with the broader pedagogical scholarship on Shakarim, where his legacy is shown to encompass intellectual, moral, aesthetic, labor-related, environmental, and family dimensions of education. At the same time, these aspects should not be treated as isolated spheres. They form part of a single normative horizon; whose final aim is the formation of a morally mature and spiritually responsible person.

This integral character of Shakarim's worldview becomes clearer when one considers his intellectual relationship with Abai. Shakarim was shaped within Abai's spiritual and intellectual school, and therefore his educational and moral philosophy developed in close continuity with Abai's ethical concerns. One of the central ideas inherited from Abai is the rejection of moral determinism. Abai's well-known categorical formulation that he would silence anyone who claims that human character cannot be corrected [2; 46] expresses a fundamental ethical conviction: the human person is capable of transformation. Character is not an unchangeable fate. This position is of major importance, because it underlies both Abai's and Shakarim's understanding of education. If the person can be corrected, then moral formation becomes possible; if moral formation is possible, then education acquires a deeper meaning than the simple transmission of knowledge. Shakarim takes this conviction further by developing a more explicit doctrine of conscience and by linking the possibility of ethical reform to the inner work of self-restraint, justice, and compassion.

For this reason, education in Shakarim's thought must be interpreted in a broad and philosophical sense. It is not limited to schooling, literacy, or social adaptation. Rather, it concerns the correction of desire, the purification of the heart, the disciplining of the mind, and the awakening of moral responsibility. In this sense, Shakarim's educational philosophy stands against any reduction of education to utility or formal

achievement. Knowledge without conscience cannot produce a truly humane order. Accordingly, the ethical significance of his pedagogy lies in its orientation toward the formation of an inwardly ordered person. This is precisely why Shakarim's educational and moral views cannot be separated: the ultimate aim of both is the same, namely, the making of a human being capable of truthful life, just action, and spiritual accountability.

Shakarim's own poetic and philosophical voice reflects this ethical seriousness in a strikingly direct form. In *Imanym*, he presents himself as someone who does not conceal social and moral defects, but exposes them openly and without compromise [3; 204]. This moral directness is not simply a stylistic feature. It reveals the ethical function that language itself acquires in his worldview. Truthful speech becomes a means of moral intervention. The word is not merely descriptive; it is corrective. At the same time, Shakarim does not treat moral criticism as an end in itself. He sees it as part of a larger responsibility before humanity and before the future. This is especially visible in his declaration that he has devoted himself to labor for humanity, conscience, and the good of all people. Here conscience is linked not only to the private inner life, but also to historical responsibility and service to future generations. The task of the thinker, therefore, is both diagnostic and constructive: he must reveal corruption, but he must also point toward moral renewal.

This orientation becomes even more explicit in Shakarim's emphasis on the unity of a pure heart, a clear mind, and honest labor. These three are not accidental moral slogans; they represent a condensed expression of his ethical anthropology. A pure heart points to inner sincerity and the overcoming of selfishness. A clear mind indicates rational lucidity and freedom from delusion. Honest labor connects morality to practical life and social responsibility. Together, these ideas show that Shakarim does not separate spirituality from action, nor inwardness from worldly conduct. The morally complete person is one whose heart, mind, and work are all ethically disciplined. This triadic ethical orientation prepares the ground for his more explicit doctrine of *ujdan*, because it already suggests that moral life requires an integration of inward and outward dimensions.

At this point, it becomes evident that Shakarim's educational ideal is inseparable from his religious and spiritual horizon. Yet this religious dimension must be interpreted carefully. In his thought, religion is not valuable merely as external ritual or inherited convention. Its deeper importance lies in the fact that it gives human moral life an ontological foundation. Only when the soul, intention, and love of the person are properly directed toward the Creator does moral life become authentic. Thus, terms such as God, Truth, the Beloved, and the Real function in Shakarim not only as theological expressions, but also as ethical markers of a higher order of meaning. This explains why morality, faith, and education are consistently intertwined in his works. Faith without moral transformation is empty, while morality without spiritual grounding remains fragile. In this respect, Shakarim's doctrine may be read as an attempt to preserve the inner unity of ethical and spiritual life against both external formalism and moral indifference.

The Islamic background of this position is especially important. A fruitful point of comparison here is al-Ghazali, whose ethical teaching also centers on the struggle against the lower tendencies of the self. In *Ihya' 'Ulum al-Din*, al-Ghazali presents the human being as capable of moral refinement through discipline, instruction, habituation, and the struggle against destructive inclinations [4; 67]. This comparative framework helps clarify Shakarim's moral anthropology. Like al-Ghazali, he does not assume that human defects are permanent or invincible. On the contrary, he presupposes that the lower self can be opposed and that character can be cultivated. Greed, vanity, lust, selfishness, cruelty, and injustice are treated not as inevitable facts of life, but as tendencies that must be corrected through moral effort. This comparison is important because it places Shakarim's thought within a broader history of Islamic ethical reflection while also making visible the specific form in which these ideas are articulated in the Kazakh intellectual tradition.

This same comparison helps explain why Shakarim attributes such importance to moral language, poetic instruction, and wise counsel. If character can be changed, then the word can serve as a means of ethical healing. In this respect, Shakarim's view is close to the broader Islamic and Turkic didactic tradition, in which poetry, aphorism, and counsel are not decorative forms, but modes of guiding the soul. The moral defect is treated as an inner illness, and truthful speech becomes one of its remedies. This is why the pedagogical and poetic dimensions of Shakarim's legacy are inseparable. He does not educate by abstraction alone, but through language that appeals simultaneously to reason, conscience, and feeling. Such a strategy is especially significant in societies where moral teaching has historically been transmitted not only through formal institutions, but also through poetic and oral culture. In that sense, Shakarim's appeal to youth and his emphasis on moral formation continue a long-standing ethical function of Kazakh intellectual and poetic tradition.

The central category that allows all these themes to be brought into conceptual unity is *ujdan*. If one remains at the level of general moral ideals, the distinctiveness of Shakarim's ethics is not yet fully visible. It becomes visible when conscience is treated not as a vague sentiment, but as a structured philosophical category. One of the most important texts in this regard is Shakarim's response to Mänen Turgambaiuly's article "Nationalism." There he opposes the assumption that nationalism and culture automatically lead to humanity. Even highly developed culture, he argues, cannot by itself produce a pure heart. What is lacking is *ujdan*, which he defines through love for all living beings, compassion, and justice, and through the fraternal recognition of all human beings [5; 15]. This formulation is exceptionally important. It shows that *ujdan* is not confined to inward remorse or personal psychological self-evaluation. Nor is it merely a lexical equivalent of the English word conscience. Rather, it is a relational, ethical, and normative principle that structures one's attitude toward others and one's place in the moral order.

This understanding reaches greater conceptual precision in *Ush Anyq*, where Shakarim states that *ujdan* consists of *ynsap*, *meirim*, and *adilet*. This triad is foundational for interpreting his ethical system. *Ynsap* indicates moral measure, self-restraint, and fairness toward the proper limits of one's own will and desire. *Meirim* expresses compassion, mercy, and humane responsiveness to others. *Adilet* names justice, rightness, and moral responsibility in action. Taken separately, each of these concepts is significant; taken together, they constitute the internal structure of conscience itself. This means that *ujdan* in Shakarim's philosophy is not a single emotion or abstract principle, but an integrated ethical whole. Conscience is present where there is restraint against selfish excess, compassion toward others, and justice in conduct. Without this triadic unity, conscience would remain incomplete. Thus, the ethical originality of Shakarim lies in the fact that he gives conscience an internal architecture.

The importance of this point becomes even more evident in Shakarim's assertion that conscience is the support necessary "for both lives" [6; 56]. This phrase is dense with philosophical meaning. It implies that *ujdan* is not only a guide for worldly action, but also the nourishment of the soul and the condition of spiritual accountability. Shakarim goes further by arguing that no science, art, law, or path can purify the heart of a person who lacks belief in this ethical truth. Even if one brackets the specifically theological implications of this claim, its philosophical force remains intact. The point is that no external system can replace inner moral formation. Institutions may regulate conduct, but they cannot by themselves create conscience. Science may expand knowledge, but it does not automatically produce justice. Law may prevent certain forms of wrongdoing, but it does not purify the heart. In this respect, Shakarim anticipates a deeply important modern ethical insight: the crisis of social life cannot be solved at the level of external order alone. The moral condition of the subject remains decisive.

From here, Shakarim's emphasis on the younger generation also acquires a deeper meaning. His concern with education is not simply social or national in a narrow sense. It is rooted in a philosophical vision of the human person as a being whose moral destiny depends on the formation of the inner self. If one neglects national and moral upbringing, then the distinction between soul and body, or between outer success and inner truth, becomes obscured. In such a situation, education risks becoming merely functional. Shakarim's response is to restore the primacy of moral orientation. The aim of education is not only to prepare for worldly life, but to form a person who can distinguish desire from duty, selfishness from conscience, and expediency from justice. This is precisely why his thought remains relevant in modernity: it insists that technical development without moral deepening cannot provide a sufficient basis for humane society.

This line of argument leads directly into the socio-ethical dimension of Shakarim's philosophy. He repeatedly asks how human life can be improved and how people can live in harmony. His answer is built not on external mechanisms first, but on ethical anthropology. Peaceful coexistence requires certain inward conditions: honest labor, a pure heart, and a conscientious mind. From the pure heart proceed mercy, love, benevolence, and honesty; from the corrupted heart come injustice, violence, arrogance, and selfishness. Here the relation between person and society becomes especially clear. Social disorder is not simply a structural accident. It is the outward manifestation of inwardly disordered desire. For that reason, Shakarim explicitly identifies lust, selfishness, and vanity as destructive forces that generate greed, cruelty, deceit, heartlessness, ambition, and bloodthirstiness. Such an analysis is philosophically significant because it traces political and social evil back to moral causes rather than treating it only at the surface level.

Yet Shakarim's doctrine does not remain at the level of diagnosis. He also formulates a positive social response. People endowed with conscience and intelligence, he suggests, should occupy positions of authority, and the young should be raised through labor, education, and lawful discipline within a morally ordered public life. This is not a fully developed political program in the modern technical sense, but it clearly

demonstrates that *ujdan* has public implications. Conscience is not merely private inwardness. It must shape education, authority, legislation, and the goals of communal life. In this way, Shakarim's doctrine connects the inner and outer dimensions of ethics without collapsing one into the other. Social reform begins in the self, but it must also extend into institutions and public norms. This balance between personal transformation and social responsibility is one of the strongest features of his moral philosophy.

The historical roots of this doctrine can be illuminated further by considering the Turkic-Islamic ethical tradition associated with Khoja Ahmad Yasawi. In his analysis of Yasawi's worldview, D. Kenzhetay notes that the mastery of *hal* is inseparable from high morality and *akhlaq*, and that the purpose of knowledge is to be useful to the people and to serve them [7; 66]. This observation is highly relevant for understanding Shakarim. The Yasawi tradition stresses liberation from the lower self, humility, service, purification of the heart, and devotion to the Creator. These are not only mystical ideals; they are ethical dispositions with social consequences. Such a framework helps explain why Shakarim's doctrine links conscience so closely with labor, justice, service, and moral purification. His thought grows out of a deeper moral tradition in which knowledge is never separated from virtue, and spirituality is never detached from responsibility toward others.

At the same time, Shakarim does not merely repeat earlier teachings. He reformulates them within the moral language of his own time and gives them greater conceptual precision. If Yasawi's tradition highlights purification and service, and if Abai places the heart at the center of the "complete human being," then Shakarim advances these insights by articulating the inner structure of conscience itself. This is precisely where the philosophical importance of the triad *Ynsap–Adilet–Meirim* becomes decisive. Through this triad, *ujdan* becomes analytically visible as a normative ethical model. It is no longer a diffuse moral intuition, but a structured principle that allows one to understand how restraint, compassion, and justice are unified in moral personhood. This is why Shakarim should be read not only as a poet or educator, but as a thinker of ethical anthropology whose work deserves a systematic place in philosophical discussion.

Seen from this perspective, the socio-educational significance of Shakarim's doctrine may be summarized in three major directions. First, it is corrective: it seeks to return those who have deviated from conscience and humanity to the right path through moral awakening, self-examination, and ethical labor. Second, it is formative: it aims to establish an educational ideal in which knowledge is subordinated to the making of just and conscientious persons. Third, it is preventive and future-oriented: it addresses youth and coming generations in order to stop moral disorientation before it becomes rooted in social life. These three dimensions show that *Ar ilimi* is neither a narrowly private ethic nor an abstract social theory. It is a doctrine of moral personhood with direct implications for pedagogy, culture, and the ethical organization of society.

In conclusion, the principles embodied in Shakarim Kudaiberdyuly's *Ar ilimi* possess not only cultural depth, but also philosophical coherence. Their significance lies in the fact that they offer a unified answer to the question of how the human being may become morally whole. The key to this doctrine is *ujdan*, interpreted not as a simple lexical equivalent of "conscience," but as an integrated ethical structure grounded in *ynsap*, *meirim*, and *adilet*. Through this structure, the person becomes capable of self-restraint, compassion, justice, responsibility, and truthful life. A critical reconstruction of these ideas makes it possible to understand more deeply both the moral worldview of the Kazakh people and the place of Shakarim within the wider history of ethical reflection. For this reason, the study of his doctrine of conscience remains important not only for historical or national reasons, but also for contemporary philosophical inquiry into moral formation, ethical anthropology, and the humane foundations of social life.

### *Conclusion*

This article has examined the concept of *ujdan* in Shakarim Kudaiberdyuly's worldview through the ethical triad *Ynsap–Adilet–Meirim* and has argued that this triad constitutes the inner normative structure of his doctrine of conscience. The analysis has shown that *ujdan* in Shakarim's philosophy should not be reduced to the narrow lexical meaning of "conscience." Rather, it functions as an integrated ethical principle that unites moral self-restraint, justice, and compassion, thereby shaping a coherent model of moral personality.

The study has also demonstrated that Shakarim's doctrine of conscience is inseparable from his broader ethical anthropology. In his thought, the moral condition of society depends directly on the moral condition of the individual, while education acquires its deepest meaning only when it is directed toward the cultivation of the heart, the disciplining of desire, and the formation of inner responsibility. In this sense, *Ar ilimi*

appears not merely as a pedagogical or spiritual teaching, but as a comprehensive philosophical doctrine concerned with the ethical reconstruction of human life.

Particular attention was given to the intellectual continuity between Abai and Shakarim, as well as to the wider Islamic ethical background represented by al-Ghazali and the Yasawi tradition. These comparative perspectives made it possible to situate Shakarim's reflections within a broader history of moral thought while preserving the originality of his conceptual language. What distinguishes Shakarim most clearly is his philosophical articulation of conscience as a structured ethical unity grounded in ynsap, meirim, and adilet.

Thus, the significance of Shakarim Kudaiberdyuly's doctrine lies in the fact that it offers not only an important key to understanding the moral worldview of the Kazakh people, but also a philosophically meaningful model for contemporary discussions of moral education, ethical anthropology, and social responsibility. The concept of ujdан, interpreted through the triad Ynsap–Adilet–Meirim, may therefore be regarded as one of the central categories of Kazakh ethical thought and as a productive concept for further philosophical research.

### *Recommendations*

Based on the findings of this study, several recommendations may be proposed. First, the concept of ujdан in Shakarim Kudaiberdyuly's thought should be studied further not only as a literary or moral notion, but as a distinct philosophical category within Kazakh ethical thought. In particular, future research may deepen the conceptual analysis of the triad Ynsap–Adilet–Meirim by examining its relation to broader questions of moral agency, conscience, and ethical subjectivity.

Second, Shakarim's doctrine of conscience should be incorporated more actively into contemporary discussions of moral education. His emphasis on the unity of self-restraint, justice, and compassion offers a productive framework for rethinking the ethical aims of education in modern society. In this regard, the principles of Ar ilimi may be used as a conceptual basis for developing value-oriented educational models in which intellectual formation is inseparable from moral responsibility.

Third, comparative philosophical research should be expanded in order to situate Shakarim's concept of ujdан within wider ethical traditions. Further studies may explore its parallels and differences in relation to the ethics of Abai, al-Ghazali, the Yasawi tradition, and broader philosophical discussions on conscience in both Eastern and Western thought. Such comparative work would help clarify the originality of Shakarim's position and strengthen the international visibility of Kazakh ethical philosophy.

Finally, it is recommended that further interdisciplinary research be conducted at the intersection of philosophy, pedagogy, religious studies, and cultural studies in order to assess the contemporary relevance of Shakarim's ethical ideas. In particular, future scholarship may examine how the doctrine of ujdан can contribute to present-day debates on moral crisis, social responsibility, spiritual renewal, and the humane foundations of public life.

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### **Шәкәрім Құдайбердіұлының этикалық триадасы: «Ұждан» концептісін философиялық реконструкциялау**

Мақалада Шәкәрім Құдайбердіұлының дүниетанымындағы «ұждан» концептісі «Ынсап — Әділет — Мейірім» этикалық триадасы арқылы зерттелді. Зерттеуде «ұждан» санаты тек тар лексикалық мағынадағы «ар-ұят» ретінде емес, моральдық өзін-өзі шектеуді, әділдік пен жанашырлықты біріктіретін интегралды этикалық принцип ретінде қарастырылады. Мақаланың мақсаты — триаданың әрбір құрамдас бөлігінің философиялық мәнін ашу және олардың бірлігі Шәкәрімнің этикалық ойындағы адамгершілік тұлғаның нормативтік моделін қалай қалыптастыратынын негіздеу. Зерттеудің методологиялық негізі Шәкәрім Құдайбердіұлының түпнұсқа философиялық, этикалық және поэтикалық мәтіндеріне сүйенеді, олар тарихи-философиялық және герменевтикалық тәсілдер арқылы интерпретацияланады. Талдау барысында «ұжданның» ішкі құрылымын және оның жан, жауапкершілік, ішкі реттеу сияқты санаттармен байланысын анықтау үшін концептуалды реконструкция және салыстырмалы интерпретация әдістері қолданылды. Зерттеу нәтижесінде «ынсап» — моральдық өлшем мен өзін-өзі тежеу, «әділет» — әділдік пен жауапкершілік принципі, ал «мейірім» — жанашырлық пен гуманистік қарым-қатынастың этикалық негізі ретінде қызмет ететіні көрсетілген. Бұл ұғымдар жиынтығы «ұжданды» жеке адамның адамгершілік өмірі мен әлеуметтік үйлесімділіктің ішкі іргетасы ретінде айқындайды. Мақалада Шәкәрімнің ұждан ілімі оның этикалық антропологиясымен тығыз байланысты екені дәлелденді. Шәкәрімнің «ұждан» концептісі қазақ этикалық ойының негізгі санаттарының бірі және оның тарихи-мәдени маңызымен қатар, заманауи адамгершілік тәрбиесі мен әлеуметтік өмірдің гуманистік негіздері туралы дискуссияларда өзектілігі жоғары.

*Кілт сөздер:* Шәкәрім Құдайбердіұлы, ұждан, ар-ұят, ынсап, әділет, мейірім, қазақ этикасы, моральдық философия, этикалық антропология.

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### **Этическая триада Шакарима Кудайбердиулы: философская реконструкция концепта «уждан»**

В данной статье исследуется концепт «уждан» в мировоззрении Шакарима Кудайбердиулы через призму этической триады «Ынсап — Адилет — Мейрим» (Умеренность — Справедливость — Милосердие). Автор обосновывает, что категорию «уждан» не следует трактовать лишь в узком лексическом значении «совести»; она представляет собой интегральный этический принцип, объединяющий моральное самоограничение, справедливость и сострадание. Целью статьи является прояснение философского смысла каждого компонента триады и демонстрация того, что их единство формирует нормативную модель нравственной личности в этической мысли Шакарима. Методологическую основу исследования составляют оригинальные философские, этические и поэтические тексты Шакарима Кудайбердиулы, интерпретируемые через историко-философский и герменевтический подходы. В ходе анализа применяются концептуальная реконструкция и сравнительная интерпретация для выявления внутренней структуры «уждан» и её связи с сопутствующими категориями, такими как душа, ответственность и внутреннее регулирование поступков. Исследование показывает, что «ынсап» функционирует как моральная мера и самоограничение, «адилет» — как принцип справедливости и ответственности, а «мейрим» — как этическая основа сострадания и гуманных отношений. В совокупности эти понятия составляют «уждан» как внутренний фундамент индивидуальной нравственной жизни и социальной гармонии. В статье доказывается, что учение Шакарима о совести неотделимо от его этической антропологии, согласно которой состояние общества напрямую зависит от морального облика личности. Результаты работы подтверждают, что концепт «уждан» является ключевой категорией казахской этической мысли, обладающей не только историко-культурной значимостью, но и актуальностью для современных дискуссий о нравственном воспитании и гуманистических основах общественной жизни.

*Ключевые слова:* Шакарим Кудайбердиулы, уждан, совесть, ынсап, адилет, мейрим, казахская этика, моральная философия, этическая антропология.

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